A Network-based Approach to Organizational Culture and Learning in System Safety  by Avnet, Mark S.
 Procedia Computer Science  44 ( 2015 )  588 – 598 
1877-0509 © 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Stevens Institute of Technology.
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2015.03.061 
ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
2015 Conference on Systems Engineering Research
A network-based approach to organizational culture and learning        
in system safety
Mark S. Avneta,*
aTexas A&M University, 4075 Emerging Technologies Building, 3131 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843-3131, USA
Abstract
While it is now generally agreed that system safety cannot be adequately addressed using technical analysis alone, an approach to 
modeling the organizational issues associated with safety is still needed. This paper offers an analytical approach to assessing the 
complex relationships among organizational culture and safety practices and outcomes. The paper argues that, in principle, 
organizational culture can be represented as a network of shared mental models (SMMs). While it would be impractical to 
construct a network that fully captures an organization’s culture, the approach can be used to model particular dimensions of 
culture. Thus, a network of SMMs is a meaningful representation of safety culture to the extent that the data effectively capture 
shared knowledge about system safety. Similarly, organizational learning can be quantified as the evolution of that network’s 
structure over time. The goal of the research is to develop a quantitative methodology for analyzing the relationship of 
organizational culture and learning to safety performance. The research is built on a collaborative effort between academia and 
industry focused on improving process safety in the oil and gas industry, but it can be applied to safety-related problems across 
organizations. The results are expected to have implications for training, professional development, safety protocols, and methods 
for measuring and managing safety practices in the development and operation of complex engineered systems.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of Stevens Institute of Technology.
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1. Introduction
System safety has emerged as a critical issue in recent years as large-scale engineered systems have become 
larger and more complex. While much of this is driven by technical complexity (larger numbers of components with 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-646-286-4739; fax:+1-979-458-4299.
E-mail address: avnet@tamu.edu
  Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc- d/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Stevens Institute of Technology.
589 Mark S. Avnet /  Procedia Computer Science  44 ( 2015 )  588 – 598 
Nomenclature
SMM Shared mental model
LNG Liquefied natural gas
PSM Process Safety Management
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Sx,y Mental model sharedness between persons x and y
MKOPSC Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center
more and more interactions among them), some of the most difficult safety-related problems have more to do with 
organizational systems and structures than with specific technical issues. As Reason argues, these “latent failures” 
are defined by their presence “within the system well before the onset of a recognizable accident sequence.”1
Leveson points out that the proximate technical cause of an accident is often only a symptom of a broader and more 
systemic problem.2 Even if the hazard seems to be of a purely technical nature without an apparent organizational 
cause at the time of the incident, the existence of the technical problem often can be attributed to “inadequate control 
over the [engineering design and] development process” rather than over operations.2 So, in such a case, the 
organizational dimension is still relevant but must be considered further upstream during engineering design.
The goal of this paper is to introduce an emerging research program focused on a systems-oriented approach to 
organizational culture and its relationship to safety practices and outcomes. In this section, a brief review of the 
literature on organizational culture and system safety is presented, and the case for a systems view of safety culture 
is made. Then, a network-based approach for modeling organizational culture and learning is introduced. Following 
that, some of the details of the methodology are presented. Finally, the application of this research to process safety 
in the oil and gas industry is discussed.
This section reviews the interdisciplinary literature that forms the basis for the proposed systems approach to 
safety culture. The first subsection discusses how the term “culture” has been defined and used in the literature and 
presents an argument for applying the concept of culture to system safety. The second subsection then discusses the 
motivation for analyzing safety culture from a systems perspective.
1.1. Organizational culture and safety performance
Schein defines culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to 
be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”3 Still, 
culture is both “broad and deep” and includes many different dimensions of an organization and its people. For this 
reason, any study of organizational culture should focus on specific elements of culture with the goal of addressing a 
particular observed phenomenon.3 While Schein’s definition is the one being used here, the scope of the present 
research is limited to safety culture, i.e., the particular elements of culture that are related to system safety. In terms 
of Schein’s definition, the “problems” solved and the resulting “way to perceive, think, and feel” are those that have 
direct or indirect implications for safety practices and outcomes.
Most researchers and practitioners agree that culture, however it is defined, plays an important role in virtually 
every aspect of an organization’s performance. Based on research and professional experience in process safety,
Mannan et al. developed a list of 10 attributes for creating a “Best-in-Class safety culture.” Although the authors 
point out that an organization does not need to possess all of these attributes to achieve excellence in safety 
performance, organizations that do have exemplary safety records tend to demonstrate some subset of these 
attributes.4 In a study of 500 organizations conducted over a 10-year period, Keller and Price examined the 
relationship between sustained operational performance and an aspect of culture that they call “organizational 
health,” a metric based on survey data assessing 37 specific management practices.5 Fig. 1 shows the authors’ 
analysis of the relationship between performance and health among several refineries of a particular oil company.
These results demonstrate a positive correlation between an organization’s focus on health-related (i.e., cultural) 
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Fig. 1. The relationship of organizational health to performance at multiple refineries of one oil company.5
dimensions and operational performance. While this result is compelling, the analysis requires data from exhaustive 
(and very long) surveys. Bergman et al., on the other hand, have shown that similar surveys, focused in this case on 
“safety climate” in particular, may have a relatively short “shelf life.” In other words, these types of surveys might
be valid for predicting safety-related incidents only within a window of a few months after the date of the survey.6
Given this outcome, the surveys used in the present research are designed to be short and targeted so that they can be 
distributed throughout the organization on a regular basis.
This subsection has discussed the relationship of culture to operational and safety performance. On the surface, it 
can appear as though these two priorities are in conflict. Indeed, as will be discussed in the next subsection, an 
overemphasis on operational performance can have a negative impact on safety in the short term.1 Similarly, taking 
measures to improve safety can slow operations on a day-to-day basis. On the other hand, such safety interventions 
can improve operational outcomes in the longer term. When the organizational, economic, and political realities of a 
major safety incident are taken into account, the incident necessarily has a negative impact on performance. In other 
words, safety and productivity are complementary objectives.1 The relationship between operational and safety 
performance, however, is not straightforward. These two priorities are linked in complex ways that involve many 
other aspects of the overall system. Thus, safety culture is best examined from a systems perspective.
1.2. Motivation for the systems perspective to safety
The idea of approaching safety – particularly in the context of complex engineered systems – from a holistic 
systems perspective that focuses on not only on technical causes of accidents but also on organizational factors is 
not a new one. The U.S. Navy’s SUBSAFE program for nuclear submarines, which was established in 1963 after the 
loss of the USS Thresher, is guided by “a basic set of risk management principles, both technical and cultural.”2 The 
program suffered one early setback in 1968 when a vessel that was not SUBSAFE certified was lost. Following that 
incident, the Navy recommitted to SUBSAFE, and the program has been an unmitigated success since that time. The 
strength of the SUBSAFE program derives from the “constructive tension” that exists among the Platform Program 
Manager, an Independent Safety and Quality Assurance Authority, and an Independent Technical Authority.
Supported by a culture of accountability and commitment from senior Navy leadership, these three entities are able 
to collectively maintain an effective and safe nuclear submarine program.2
Despite the success of SUBSAFE, the basic approach of emphasizing cultural aspects and ensuring accountability 
has not been widely emulated. Following the 1986 loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger, for example, the Rogers 
Commission recommended the formation of an independent oversight entity that would be held accountable for 
system safety but not for cost and schedule.7 Although NASA established an independent safety office at 
Headquarters in Washington, DC in response to the report, the office did not have the enforcement authority to be 
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effective. Furthermore, during the era of “faster, better, cheaper” under Administrator Daniel Goldin in the 1990s, 
the responsibility for this oversight was pushed back to the human spaceflight program. This act compromised the 
independence of the safety office and ultimately contributed to the Columbia tragedy in 2003.8
This climate of operational pressures, inadequate oversight, and failure to learn from past mistakes is not limited 
to NASA. The oil and gas industry, for example, sustained its own tragic loss with the explosion at the BP refinery 
in Texas City, Texas on March 23, 2005, which resulted in 15 deaths and 180 injuries. Among its organizational 
findings, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board cited cost and production pressures, a lack of 
effective safety oversight, and the absence of “a reporting and learning culture” as key contributing factors to the 
accident.9 Similarly, in a separate analysis triggered by the accident but more broadly focused on overall process 
safety across BP’s five U.S. refineries, the Baker Panel criticized BP for its inadequate process safety leadership and 
decentralized safety management system. Although clear differences exist across the five refineries, the panel 
identified “significant process safety culture issues” at each of them.10
According to Leveson, the weaknesses inherent in the safety programs at NASA, BP, and countless other 
organizations are rooted in the fundamental approach to the problem. Although the traditional view of safety 
engineering as a reliability problem might have been adequate in the past, modern engineered systems have reached 
a level of complexity at which it is not possible to effectively model safety in terms of the combined probabilities of 
individual component failures. In reality, most accidents cannot be understood or prevented by focusing on 
component reliability. Instead, Leveson applies systems engineering principles to argue that the true cause of most 
accidents lies in the interactions among components. Moreover, these interactions are not limited to technical 
components but involve complex feedback and control among both technical and organizational elements. Based on 
this view, Leveson suggests that the entire field of safety engineering needs to be rethought. Safety is not a 
reliability problem; it is a control problem.2
To understand this view of safety as a control problem, consider the interactions depicted in Fig. 2. According to 
this model, a controller (human or machine) controls a process by initiating certain actions that are based on 
feedback from the controlled process. The rules that determine how the controller translates that feedback into an 
action are based on the controller’s process model. For a computer controller, the process model is typically an 
algorithm. For a human controller, the process model is referred to as the person’s mental model of the system or 
process.2 This control-based perspective can apply to technical hazards in which the problem comes not from a 
component failure but from a flaw in the complex interactions among hardware and/or software components.
Beyond that, however, this model also can often capture the organizational issues related to an accident even more 
effectively than it does the technical issues. For example, Leveson points out that both the Challenger and Columbia
accidents “involved inadequate controls in the launch-decision process.”2
At first glance, it may appear that multiple human controllers’ process models for an engineered system should 
be roughly the same, but this is seldom the case. Consider how a designer’s mental model might differ from the 
functioning of the actual system. The designer’s understanding of the system is generally based on an idealized state 
derived from equations and software models, but the real-world conditions in which the system exists differ from 
Fig. 2. Leveson’s control model of system safety.2
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that ideal state in important ways. The operator, in turn, develops his/her own mental model based on some 
combination of the designer’s specifications and his/her operational experience with the actual system.2 These 
differences in mental models can propagate across the entire system, resulting in a condition in which every 
individual involved – whether operator, designer, or manager – has a somewhat different mental model of the 
system. The next section presents an approach for studying the extent of similarities and differences across the 
mental models of all individuals involved in the system.
2. Shared knowledge, culture, and learning
Senge defines a learning organization as one “where people continually expand their capacity to create the results 
they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, 
and where people are continually learning how to learn together.”11 According to Senge, becoming a learning 
organization requires five “disciplines”: personal mastery, mental models, shared vision, team learning, and systems 
thinking. Systems thinking, Senge argues, is essential to ensuring that the other four disciplines work together as a 
coherent whole.11 The remainder of this paper attempts to develop a formal and rigorous methodology for measuring 
an organization’s approach to system safety against this goal.
The purpose of this section is to present an approach for analyzing shared knowledge in an organization using 
social network analysis. First, the literature on shared mental models is reviewed. Then, the basic principles of social 
network analysis are explained, and the rationale for representing organizational culture as a social network of 
shared mental models is described. Finally, some background literature on organizational learning is provided, and 
an argument for representing organizational learning as the time evolution of shared knowledge networks is 
presented.
2.1. Shared mental models
The term “mental model” is generally used to describe the way in which an individual perceives his or her 
environment. Some authors refer to a mental model as a catch-all for any knowledge about a given environment 
while others use the term only to describe organized knowledge that helps one to “understand phenomena, make 
inferences, and experience events by proxy.”12 Rouse and Morris define mental models more specifically as 
“mechanisms whereby humans are able to generate descriptions of system purpose and form, explanations of system 
functioning and observed system states, and predictions of future system states.”13 Based on this definition, two 
people can be said to hold a shared mental model (SMM) if they utilize mechanisms that lead to similar descriptions, 
explanations, and predictions of the system.
To ensure that the concept is useful across a variety of contexts, a distinction is often drawn among different 
types of SMMs based on their underlying content. Cannon-Bowers et al. classify mental models into two categories: 
task mental models (those that facilitate accomplishing a task) and team mental models (those that allow each 
individual to work effectively as a member of the team).14 In two related studies, Mathieu et al. drew an empirical 
distinction between team and task mental models in two-person teams, or dyads. To operationalize SMMs, they 
computed a score based on the participants’ perceptions of relationships among several task and team attributes.15,16
Kameda et al. conducted a study to measure the effect of “cognitive centrality” in teams of three, or triads. To do 
this, they constructed what they call a sociocognitive network and proposed a measure of cognitive centrality in the 
network.17 Lim and Klein took this idea of examining shared cognition in larger teams a step further.18 Based on a 
field study of 71 seven- to eight-person air combat teams, they devised a means of measuring shared knowledge for 
the entire team. Rather than looking only at shared knowledge in dyads as is done in much of the literature, they 
computed the average level of sharedness among all possible pairs of team members. The authors measured mental 
model accuracy by computing the same metric for each team member against experts’ responses about the task.18
The above study made an important contribution by extending shared mental models to larger teams, but the 
approach was still a simple mean-based aggregation of pair-wise shared mental models. It did not provide a means 
of analyzing patterns of interactions among mental models. Langan-Fox et al. describe such patterns as “a 
synergistic functional aggregation of the [team’s] mental functioning representing similarity, overlap, and 
complementarity.”19 Similarly, Klimoski and Mohammed refer to this phenomenon as “an emergent characteristic of 
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the group, which is more than just the sum of individual models.”12 Building on this view of shared knowledge as 
emerging from SMMs among individuals, Avnet and Weigel developed a methodology for measuring shared 
knowledge based on the notion that teams are themselves complex systems in which people are the components.20
While Lim and Klein measured averages of shared mental models across the team,18 Avnet and Weigel extended the 
approach by examining complex patterns of relationships across all pair-wise SMMs in the team using social 
network analysis.20 The next subsection explains the concept of social network analysis and then discusses how a 
network of shared knowledge can provide a system-level representation of safety culture in an organization.
2.2. Social networks and the structure of shared knowledge
Network analysis refers to a set of methods and techniques used to understand the global properties among a 
group of interacting entities in a complex system. A network consists of nodes, which represent individual entities, 
and edges (or arcs), which connect the nodes according to some type of relationship or interaction. A network is 
directed if its edges represent directional flow from one node to another. Otherwise, the network is undirected.
Social networks are those used to analyze communication patterns or relationships among people in 
organizations.21,22 In this type of network, a node usually represents a person, and an edge represents a measurable 
communication or a relationship between two people. Because of its emphasis on global patterns of interactions 
among large numbers of entities, social network analysis is scalable to networks of any size (limited pragmatically, 
of course, by computational capacity).
The purpose of studying networks is to understand broad properties of the overall structure of a system of 
interacting entities. For this reason, network analysis is often also called structural analysis.21 Avnet and Weigel 
applied this perspective to shared knowledge in engineering design teams.20 In their undirected networks of SMMs, 
each node represents a team member and each edge the shared mental model between a pair of team members. Two 
specific examples of these shared knowledge networks are shown in Fig. 3. The pattern of edges in such a network 
constitutes the structure of shared knowledge in the team. The authors therefore call this technique the structural 
approach to shared knowledge.20
Given the scalability of social network analysis, the structural approach is applicable to teams of any size and to 
large organizations. In this context, the structure of the shared mental model network is a representation of the 
“pattern of shared basic assumptions” that make up culture according to Schein’s definition.3 The limitation to the 
network’s usefulness as a representation of culture then lies in the content of the shared mental models represented 
by each edge. To the extent that the survey questions used effectively capture shared knowledge about safety, it can 
be said that such a network is a quantitative representation of the organization’s safety culture.
In real-world organizations, it is unlikely that the network representation of shared knowledge will stay constant 
over time. At most, the network model describes a particular aspect of organizational culture – in this case safety 
culture – at a snapshot in time. In other words, it is a static view of safety culture. In the next subsection, a dynamic 
view of this type of network is described, and an argument is presented for using the time evolution of the network 
as a measure of organizational learning.
2.3. Shared knowledge and organizational learning
According to Leveson’s description of a system’s safety control structure, the process model held by an 
individual human controller is that person’s mental model.2 Thus, the shared mental model held by a pair of such 
individuals is a representation or a result of the interactions between their process models. If a problem arises in the 
way that control actions and feedback are transmitted, these mental models could become inaccurate representations 
of the system. This condition would be exacerbated as the process models interact with and influence each other 
indirectly through other feedback and controls within the system. Leveson argues that most instances of “human 
error” can be traced to system-level issues that result in a mismatch between the individual’s process model and the 
actual system.2
Given the set of complex feedback loops that Leveson describes in many modern systems,2 it can be said that the 
process model of one controller can influence several aspects of the controlled system, which in turn affects other 
human controllers’ process models. In the case of a “mismatch” as described above, this set of complex interactions 
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Fig. 3. Structure of shared knowledge in an engineering design team at two points in time: (a) before the work was completed and (b) after 
the work was completed.20
among mental models constitutes group think, the potential drawback of shared mental model development. On the 
other hand, when individuals’ process models are appropriately aligned and converge over time toward a true 
representation of the actual system (i.e., they develop “correct” mental models), this type of change can be viewed 
as learning in the organization.
In the literature, organizational learning is defined as “a change in the organization’s knowledge that occurs as a 
function of experience.”23 For the purposes of the present research, the “organization’s knowledge” is 
operationalized as the structure of the network of shared mental models. Thus, according to the definition cited 
above, organizational learning can be viewed as an overall change in the structure of shared knowledge over time.
This view of learning is consistent with observations that “organizational learning is not simply the sum of each 
member’s learning.”24 That is, organizational learning is an emergent property that depends not only on individual 
learning but also on the pattern of interactions among the learning of all individuals.
In their study of systems engineering teams working on early conceptual design of scientific spacecraft, Avnet 
and Weigel developed a metric for change in shared knowledge based on an edge-by-edge correlation of a shared 
knowledge network at different points in time. The evolution of one such network is shown graphically in Fig. 3.
Based on this analysis, the authors demonstrated a statistically significant correlation between change in shared 
knowledge and each of several technical characteristics of the system. Two examples of these relationships are 
shown in Fig. 4. In addition, the authors also found a correlation between change in shared knowledge and team 
coordination. Because of the difficulty in assessing quality of outcomes in early-stage conceptual design, the authors
were not able to draw conclusions about the relationship of change in shared knowledge to performance.20 Several 
studies in other contexts, however, have provided evidence that organizational learning is related to improved 
performance.25,26
This section has presented the rationale for studying safety culture and organizational learning using networks of 
shared mental models about factors that influence safety in the organization. In the next section, the specific 
methods used to construct and analyze these networks are presented.
3. Methods
This section describes a systems-oriented approach for analyzing organizational culture and learning. The
approach is built on the methods developed by Avnet and Weigel, and the reader is referred to that study for a more 
complete description of its methods.20 The present research differs from those methods in three important ways.
First, this study uses survey questions on factors that influence safety rather than questions on engineering design 
drivers. Second, the surveys include additional questions that address cultural as well as technical and operational 
issues. Finally, this research takes advantage of the inherent scalability of network analysis by studying shared 
knowledge networks in large organizations rather than in teams. The author has partnered with Sentis, a global 
safety culture consultancy, to pilot the survey tools in a real-world context within the offshore oil and gas industry.
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Fig. 4. Relationship of change in shared knowledge among members of engineering design teams to two technical attributes of the designed 
system: development time and system mass. Adapted from Avnet and Weigel.20
Sentis has piloted the survey in a specific systems engineering context, the construction of an undersea liquefied
natural gas (LNG) extraction and refining platform in the Oceania region. The survey respondents are employees of 
a Sentis client contracted to complete this work for one of the world’s leading oil and gas manufacturers.
At the time of this paper’s writing, data collection has only recently begun. As such, this section discusses the 
data currently being collected and the planned analysis. The section is organized as follows. In the first subsection, 
the approach to measuring shared mental models and constructing shared knowledge networks in the context of 
system safety is described. In the second subsection, the method for measuring structural changes in shared 
knowledge networks over time is briefly reviewed. Finally, in the last subsection, the intended analysis to determine 
the relationship of learning to safety practices and outcomes is briefly discussed.
3.1. Constructing a network of shared knowledge
To define their metric for shared knowledge, Avnet and Weigel conducted an extensive literature review of prior 
studies measuring shared mental models in operational teams. Based on this work and on the factors that distinguish 
engineering design from operations, they created a survey asking design team members to check boxes 
corresponding to aspects of the system that most significantly drive the design work.20 In early stage conceptual 
design, relationships among factors are generally open-ended or are not yet fully articulated. Thus, it would be 
difficult for a respondent to provide meaningful granularity in his/her responses to these questions.  For this reason, 
simple check boxes were used instead of the Likert scales employed in most of the prior studies that focused on
operations rather than design.15,16,18 Data collection for the present research is similar to the approach taken by Avnet 
and Weigel but has been tailored to safety culture in the oil and gas industry. Thus, the survey is not based on
system design drivers but instead asks respondents to rate various technical and organizational factors that influence
safety. Furthermore, because many of the questions in this context necessarily involve the respondents’ degree of 
agreement with various statements about each of the safety factors examined, a Likert scale is more appropriate than 
it was in the engineering design context. Depending on the organizational context, answer choices can include such 
issues as codification of protocols, adherence to procedures, tribal knowledge, management emphasis on safety and 
on production, risk tolerance in the group and in the organization, personal dynamics among operators, union rules, 
government regulations, safety-related features of equipment, and other specifics of the organization and/or 
technology that vary across companies and processes. For the Sentis pilot study, the factors chosen were based on 
three types of sources: the 14 elements of process safety management (PSM) as established by the U.S. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)27 and equivalent documents used in other countries, 
interviews with Sentis experts on process safety in the oil and gas industry, and documentation of specific practices 
and procedures used by the client organization. A portion of the survey currently in use is shown in Fig. 5.
The survey data will be used to calculate a metric of mental model sharedness, Sx,y, for each pair of respondents x
and y. In the engineering design context, the metric was carefully chosen based on specifics of the design context 
and was validated, as shown in Fig. 4, against technical characteristics of the engineered system being designed.20
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Fig. 5. Sample survey questions distributed to the construction crew for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) extraction and refining platform.
In the case of system safety, a similar process will be used to ensure that the chosen metric captures the important 
features related to safety culture and will be validated by relating its values under various conditions to known 
features of a given organizational context (e.g., number of employees, production volume, complexity of technical 
processes). A network of shared knowledge will then be constructed with Sx,y as the edge between each pair of nodes 
x and y, and various metrics characterizing the network will be calculated. In engineering design, Avnet and Weigel 
measured relationships of the evolution of the shared knowledge network over time to various features of the 
technical design work, but they did not identify any structural features of each static network that related to the 
technical attributes examined.20 This, however, will not necessarily be the case in the context of system safety. Thus, 
centrality measures will be used to determine the relative importance of knowledge held by each individual at a 
point in time. Although it is widely acknowledged that leadership support is critical to implementing and sustaining 
change in an organization,3,5 other members of the organization could occupy central positions in the network based 
on their personalities and/or their own approaches to safety. Krackhardt and Hanson have analyzed informal 
networks in organizations, classifying such networks as advice, trust, and communication.28 The present research
will include an investigation of the possibility of shared knowledge networks serving as a fourth type of informal 
network – the knowledge network. 
3.2. Measuring organizational learning
Avnet and Weigel calculated an edge-by-edge correlation of each shared knowledge network at different points
in time to determine the extent to which shared knowledge remained stable over time, and a simple transformation 
of this similarity measure resulted in a metric for change in shared knowledge.20 As shown in Fig. 3, the authors 
constructed a network of shared knowledge before and after each design session. Because the sessions each lasted 
for only five days, it was not possible to measure precisely how shared knowledge evolved over time.
Similarly, in the Sentis pilot study, the crew has been deployed for a well-defined and relatively short mission, 
which does not allow for multiple time points to be used. Thus, this pilot study includes only surveys at the start and 
at the end of the work, as was done in the engineering design context.20 As the research develops, however, the 
shared mental model surveys will be distributed regularly. Depending on the specifics of the organizations studied, 
distribution could be weekly, semi-weekly, or monthly. Survey frequencies will likely be adjusted based on the 
willingness of participants and on the time scales over which meaningful changes seem to occur early in the study.
Using these time series data, shared knowledge networks will be constructed at multiple points in time. This will
make it possible to plot a trajectory of changes in shared knowledge over time. The shape of the resulting curve can 
then be used to understand how safety-related learning takes place in an organization.
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3.3. Relationship to safety practices and outcomes
This research program will involve measuring technical performance, adherence to safety practices, and safety 
outcomes in the organizations studied. For the pilot study, data on safety performance outcomes will be obtained 
from the client at the conclusion of the platform construction project. In addition, Sentis has conducted structured 
interviews with more than 20 crew members and client personnel to assess safety practices, and the analysis of the 
interview data is ongoing at the time of this paper’s writing. After the data have been collected, the findings about 
organizational culture and learning determined from the SMM networks will be related to safety performance 
metrics. It is not yet clear what the exact performance metrics will be for Sentis’ client or for other organizations 
studied. The specific metrics used will undoubtedly be shaped, at least in part, by the particular organizations 
involved in the study. In the next section, the future directions of the research program are briefly discussed.
4. Conclusion and future directions
The nascent research program presented here began with a discussion among academics and practitioners from 
the oil and gas, chemical, and nuclear industries during a meeting of the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center
(MKOPSC) at Texas A&M University. The MKOPSC serves as a hub for research and discussion on process safety, 
and it facilitates research partnerships among industry, government, and academia. While most of the work of the 
MKOPSC focuses on technical proximate causes, there is a growing awareness among its members that the path to 
improving process safety needs to include a strong emphasis on safety culture.
Since those initial discussions, members of the MKOPSC have met regularly to discuss a research program 
focused on the network approach to organizational culture and learning as presented in this paper. In addition to the 
partnership already established with Sentis to work with many of the company’s clients, interest in the research is 
also growing steadily among major companies in the process industries. It remains to be seen how the research will 
progress in the coming months, but the author and members of the MKOPSC are encouraged by the potential of the 
Sentis pilot study and by the response that the research approach has generated so far from major oil and gas 
companies. Ultimately, the goal of this research is to demonstrate the complex organizational factors involved in 
system safety and to develop a systems-oriented methodology for measuring organizational culture and learning
about safety. The outcomes of the work will have direct implications for organizational and technical issues relevant 
to the development of a variety of complex engineered systems ranging from the ocean-based platforms and oil 
refining facilities examined in this investigation to a host of other systems engineering contexts, including aerospace 
systems, transportation, and patient safety in healthcare systems. From a practical standpoint, this understanding can 
be used to develop more targeted incentive structures, communication mechanisms, standard procedures, training
programs, and technical system features that will help to ensure the development and management of safer systems 
engineering organizations in the future.
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